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The 'Strategic' Approach
The apparent agricultural failure of most African
developing countries, especially their failure to
increase food output per person, has led to a great
flowering of 'strategic' proposals. The World Bank's
plan for 'accelerated development', known as the Berg
Report, advocates not only a sharp rise in the
proportion of public outlays (and of international aid)
that supports private African agriculturists, but also
sharp shifts of the domestic terms of trade in their
favour, and heavy concentration on export crops
[World Bank 1982a]. The OAU's 'Lagos plan of
action', like its offspring in the work of the Southern
African Development Coordinating Committee, is
orientated to the replacement of food imports, but
despite much stress upon agriculture's 'priority' seeks
aid above all for new publicly-owned transport links
and industrial producers; both emphases might help
farmers indirectly, but both are geared primarily
towards greater political independence, and towards
securing Africa's share in 'targets' set by UNCTAD
for growing Third World proportions of industrial
production [OAU 1981].
These two central strategies are moderately and
intelligently presented. Much of their content, too, is
indisputable: prices turned harshly against farmers
[World Bank 1982a] and increasingly massive reliance
upon food imports [OAU 1981] are incompatible with
sustained agricultural progress. Yet, although the
OAU and Bank expository documents are filled with
gestures of mutual respect and even agreement, they
sound a little like a somewhat tired, and not very
Afrocentric, re-run of the Latin American develop-
ment debates of 1957-64. These debates set publicly-
sponsored, import-substituting development in a
planned economy against privately-managed, export-
promoting development in an open economy.' The
needs of agriculturists, especially of smallholders in
Africa, easily go unheard beneath the clash; for it is
grand, ideological, and essentially industry-orientated.
The French radicals of 1968 proclaimed 'Ni Marx ni
Jésus'; does broadly-based and efficient agricultural
growth in Africa require 'Ni Berg ni Lagos'?
The two opposing views were both well argued by Raoul Prebisch
in, respectively [1959] and [1964].
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Two other strategies, now in the course of being
formulated, may hold out more prospects for meeting
the specific needs of African farmers. The first strategy
is implicit in the Charter of the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). The Charter
directs IFAD to use its funds mainly to meet the food
requirements of the poorest people in the poorest
developing countries. IFAD, therefore, is almost
bound to spotlight the great mass of African
subsistence producers. In contrast to Asia, it is these
and not 'landless labourers' (rural or urban) who form
the great bulk of Africa's potentially hungry poor.
They are mostly too small to be reached by the World
Bank's 'smallholder' strategy, with its emphasis
(initially at least) on producers and areas that seem
more promising and progressive in the existing state of
techno-economic knowledge. Also, most subsistence
mini-farmers are insufficiently integrated into the
urban economy to provide surpluses for it, and
therefore do not appeal to the industrialising
strategists of Lagos. IFAD could provide important
guidelines, and funds, for development aimed at this
large, poor group.
The other new approach stems from the increasing
disillusionment of the Nordic and EEC aid donors
with piecemeal rural activity in Africa. This
disillusionment covers not only project aid (especially
if it is 'integrated' across activities involving several
weakly-coordinated ministries), but also food aid,
which is increasingly seen as encouraging recipient
governments to delay attention to agriculture. As an
alternative, Nordic and EEC donors are seeking
particular ways to help African countries to develop,
not specific projects or aid requests, but a) total
strategies for allocating resources, by private
incentives and/or public action, towards rural
activity; and b) policy, planning and implementation
machinery (and human capacity) to make, change, and
carry out such strategies for themselves in future. The
Swedish aid agency, SIDA, has undertaken a series of
'rural-sector strategy missions' in East African
countries. And the new head of EEC's Directorate
General for Development (DG 8), Commissioner
Edgard Pisani, having expressed deep doubts about
existing EEC food and project aid, is seeking to
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reconstruct the substantial (and largely African) EDF
programme increasingly around a series of 'food
strategies', to eliminate undernutrition and food-
dependency in a defined time-horizon [COM (82)
640]. Such strategies are, of course, to be developed by
the countries themselves, with technical assistance
only if they want it. The first four 'strategies' are being
proposed by Kenya, Mali, Zambia and Rwanda.
All this is reminiscent of the World Bank's shift from
project overview to 'policy dialogues', a shift designed
to improve the Bank's impact on national development
patterns. Like that shift, the 'rural strategy' approach
is partly a recognition that normally a single aid
project has far less effect on total (or rural)
development than, say, policy on prices or personnel.
Indeed, aid in support of any particular project may
merely displace government support for the same
project, so that the aid is effectively supporting the
marginal, least-important government activity: what
Hans Singer calls the 'fungibility problem'. Partly,
too, the move towards national strategy-building and
policy dialogue is a response to donors' resource
scarcity; advice is cheaper than aid projects.2 More
positively, however, a real case exists for this new
emphasis. Rural and other development strategies, as
attempted by developing countries or as advocated by
funding agencies, are too prone to changing fashions.
Both the EEC and its African associates need a series
of medium-term, country-specific plans to achieve
defined goals.3 In that context, the Pisani concept of
country-by-country 'food strategies' may well be more
tangible and specific than SIDA's search for
comprehensive 'rural development strategies'. The
goal of removing undernutrition in a specified time-
frame is attractive, definable, and ofteh attainable.
This article seeks to clarify some of the issues and
requirements facing any EEC programme to assist
African countries in developing 'food strategies'.
Five main issues are considered, each very briefly.
First, any strategies to end undernutrition in Africa
need to examine its scale, nature and causes (next
section). Second, to design any such strategy, based
either on food-based agriculture or on trade, African
and EEC planners could benefit from, and indeed may
require, some tolerably reliable data (third section).
Third, a national strategy for food-based agriculture
has to select a 'mix' between approaches based on
generalised price-incentives, on inputs of current and
capital resources, on efforts to change the agricultural
output-mix, ön the rural 'surround', and on research,
development and spread of new technologies (fourth
section). Fourth, there are linked choices to be made
2 But is advice less likely to be accepted as accompanying project
aid becomes scarcer?
This does not imply directive or comprehensive planning;
indicative planning, with price incentives, is an alternative way to
achieve such goals.
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between big and small units of activity, and between
labour-intensity and capital-intensity (fifth section).
Finally and crucially, there are questions about the
EEC itself: can its 'project cycle', country pro-
gramming, related trade policy enable it to follow
through its own commitments to support country-
specific food strategies, or to help African states to
develop and implement such strategies (last section)?
This article will concentrate on points of fairly
fundamental, though I hope constructive, criticism. It
should, however, be recorded that the 'food strategy'
approach - if it can survive the resource shortage,
and the objections of some politicians in the EEC
- will constitute an enormous advance on earlier
EEC approaches to its relationship with the ACP
states.
Scale, Nature and Causes of Undernutrition
in Africa
The evidence increasingly suggests that - while
unpleasant, even painful, hunger is widespread -
dangerous or damaging undernutrition, due to
inability to afford enough food, is confined to 10-15
per cent of populations in African and Asian low-
income countries.4 Undernutrition therefore does not
threaten all of the 40-50 per cent of such populations
who are classified as 'in poverty'.5 Most such people
are indeed often miserable, and deprived of basic
needs such as health care, shelter, and school; but only
the 10-15 per cent who are ultra-poor require a
strategy of 'food (or income-to-buy-food) first' as a
precondition for enjoying the fruits of development.6
Elsewhere I review the complex but increasingly
massive evidence for this proposition, but, in view of
its importance to the EEC in helping ACP countries to
design a 'food strategy', the three main lines of
reasoning must be indicated here.7
Dietary energy ('calorie') requirements may be
overstated, for five reasons. First, the standard
FAO/WHO requirements for average Western
persons appear to be considerably too high,
supporting, for example, the dietary build-up and
lt is increasingly agreed that food shortage (scarce calories), not
food structure (eg too few proteins), is the main medium by which
poverty causes undernutrition.
References and evidence for this and other remarks in this section
will appear in the author's forthcoming World Bank Staff
Working Paper [19831, Poverty. Undernutrition and Hunger.
5This would imply some 5Omn people in Africa (mid-1982),
excluding the Northern group of states and South Africa. Strictly,
the 10-15 per cent refers to adult-equivalents, not 'people'.
Undernutrition is concentrated in under-fives; a given caloric
shortfall affects them more seriously, and they are themselves
concentrated in the poorest households. Hence a 15-20 per cent
figure for persons (as opposed to adult-equivalents) at risk of
undernutrition would be an appropriate 'safe' upper bound.
See footnote 5.
maintenance of a good deal of excess body fat. Second,
the conversion of these requirements to tropical
circumstances and body-weights appears to add
further elements of overstatement. Third, individuals
may choose below-average lifelong caloric intakes not
because they are too poor to do otherwise but because
their bodies signal below-average requirements.
Fourth, the capacity of any one individual to increase
bodily efficiency during temporary periods of
moderate dietary shortfall implies that 'average'
requirements, per kilogram per day, overstate these
requirements during such periods. Finally, where
energy intakes really do fall short of requirements, it
may be more cost-effective to reduce requirements (for
example, by reducing internal parasites that share
food with their human hosts; or the long walks needed
to fetch distant water) rather than to raise intakes.
The second main line of reasoning is that most careful
studies show no lasting damage from states of 'mild-
to-moderate undernutrition' in under-fives.8 Infant
and child mortality, in Chen's classic Bangladesh
survey, was unaffected; similar results were obtained
for subsequent school performance (holding non-
nutritional 'social variables' constant) in the equally
distinguished Guatemalan (INCAP) work of Klein;
and for most indicators of adolescent physical
performance, as followed up in the long-term studies
of India's National Institute of Nutrition. All these
indicators - life chances, school performance,
physical capacity - suffered significantly only when
child undernutrition was 'severe'.
Third, economic behaviour suggests that perceived
priority for extra calories is found only among the
poorest 10-15 per cent of persons in low-income
countries. When income rises slightly, only these
people maintain all three of the following: a) the share,
normally 75-85 per cent, of outlay devoted to food; b)
the share of food outlay going to carbohydrate
sources; and c) the share of such sources coming from
cheap cereals and root crops. The 'poor but not ultra-
poor', when income rises, diversify their spending into
pleasanter, more varied foods, and into better
clothing, shelter, etc.
The operational conclusion to be drawn from these
findings is important. The poorest 10-15 per cent
comprise a manageable target for a policy to end
undernutrition in Africa in the 1980s, whereas the
poorest 45-50 per cent do not. That is the bright side.
The dark side is that even agencies such as the World
undernutrition implies weight/age ratio below 60 per cent
of the 50th percentile on the Harvard scales, height/age ratio
below 80 per cent (or 75 per cent on the Gomez version), or
weight/height below 70 per cent. Moderate undernutrition:
respectively 60-75 per cent; 85-90 per cent (or 75-85 per cent
Gomez); or 70-80 per cent. Mild: respectively 75-90 per cent; 90-95
per cent (or 85-92.5 per cent Gomez); or 80-90 per cent.
Bank, justly proud of their success in redirectingmuch
rural lending towards the poor, bemoan their inability
to benefit the poorest decile or two [World Bank
1982b]. Paternalist approaches, such as persuading
the 'poorest' to redirect food towards women and
children, are unlikely to work.9 A review of the
handful of Asian projects that have genuinely
increased the capacity of the 'poorest' both to produce
values and to acquire food may be an important
component in any 'food strategy' to reach Africa's
neediest. These are projects such as the Employment
Guarantee Schemes of some Indian States, or lending
to landless artisans by Bangladesh's Gramm Bank.
The Need for Data
EEC's new approach depends mainly on increased
agricultural output, especially of food. To assess the
prospects for this, it is necessary to have some idea of
how such output and income to buy food has changed
in recent years, both in amount and in distribution. It
is also desirable to know the amount, timing, and
likely prices of major inputs used to grow the main
food staples - and, if possible, of alternative crops
that might use the resources of land, water, and labour
now devoted to those staples.
Our knowledge of the basic facts about staple food
production in Africa is negligible as compared with
Asia or Latin America. Suppose that the FAO reports
an official figure for production (X) of a staple food in
an African country in a given year: there are not more
than six countries - probably only four - where one
can state, with a better than 95 per cent chance of being
correct, that true physical output in that year lay
between 75 and 125 per cent of X. In the case of meat
and dairy output from traditional herds, and of food
output from smallholdings, an even larger range, say
60- 140 per cent of X would probably be more
appropriate. We know a little more about the amount
(though not the timing) of labour required to produce
a given output-per-acre under assorted field conditions
in some African countries, provided that only one
crop is grown in the field; but of African inputs into
the prevailing (and sensible) cultivation of mixed
crops, and even more into small traditional herds of
l-10 cattle, we know almost nothing.
Bitty indicators - relative and absolute food prices in
free markets, the volume of food imports, the
changing incidence of undernutrition in places where
income-distribution has apparently changed little -
do allow us to be fairly confident that in sub-Saharan
'i data (unlike North Indian and Bangladeshi studies) show
no significant excess of female, child or daughter undernutrition:
Schofield [1979]; J. Kreysler and C. Schlage, 'The nutrition
situation in the Pangani basin', and R. Korte, 'The nutritional and
health status of the Mwea-Tebare irrigation settlement' in Kraut
and Cremer [1969].
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Africa both food output per person, and to a lesser
extent food availability per person, have declined
considerably (by somewhere between 5 and 15 per cent)
as between comparable years in the late 1960s and in
the early 1 980s.'° However, our profound ignorance of
the most basic facts of African farm activity militates
severely against sensible strategy-building. Country-
wide crop-cutting sample surveys have been carried
out in most South Asian nations for 30 years or more;
in vast areas of Africa, 20 or more years after
independence, agro-ignorance prevails, despite endless
talk about agriculture, and substantial production of
national 'income' data and complex models based on
them. Of course, mixed cropping, root crops, and
transhumant herding mean that cereal and pulse crop-
cuts cannot tell us all we need to know. But our
ignorance of what the great mass of small, settled
African cultivators and herders do, and of how much
they produce by doing it, is surely a relatively easily
remediable barrier to effective rural policy-making.
Suppose a significant part - sayS-lOper cent - of the
aid and technical assistance to African agriculture
were used, for five years, to set up and train indigenous
capacity to supervise and check the regular and
scientific collection of timed, sample data on each
season's inputs and outputs, for cereal and root crops
(including mixes) and for animals, across the range of
major products, conditions, and sizes of farm
operation. By 1988 the African nations could have, at
last, a sound basis for future agricultural policy-
making. Of course, the hungry cannot (and need not)
wait until the facts are kñown. But certainly an EEC
food strategy should give high priority, not to a once-
for-all exercise in census-type fact-finding curiosity,
but to helping the selected ACP countries to design
regular, efficient agricultural statistical services able to
collect typical, reliable farm data on a regular basis.
Such services should not be lavish or grandiose, but
must have proper career structures, and access to
policymakers. Agricultural statisticians must not be
second-class citizens in a statistical service giving pride
of place to national accounts, which mean little if the
agricultural data are unreliable."
0 rapid rise in food imports per person accounts for the smaller
decline in food availability.
'Even less explicably, the EEC also lacks the data to assess its
contribution to a trade-based (as opposed to a food-production-
based) strategy to reduce undernutrition. For example, the EEC's
changing share in the trade of individual or grouped developing
countries (ACP or other) is invariably presented in value terms.
This begs the crucial policy questions: was the change due to
changes in relative volumes of EEC and 'rest-of-the-world' trade
with the relevant partner(s) - or to changes in relative prices? In
either case, was it supply, demand, or both that moved differently
for EEC and for other trading partners of the Third World?
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Which Approach to Take
Let us assume that the development of a 'food
strategy' is directed mainly at the dangerously
undernourished 10-15 per cent of persons, and that it
is supported by a rapidly improving base of
production data. What are the main thrusts of such a
strategy likely to be? Of course the answers will differ
according to the prospects of each country - and its
problems. In one or two African countries, price-
incentives are so húrrendously distorted that little can
be done until they are adjusted. In almost all, much
more than in Asia or Latin America, the role of
agriculture as a milch cow (to support a dubiously
productive urban elite, in both public and private
sectors) produces price distortions that harm
efficiency and equity alike.'2 Nevertheless, there are
grounds to question the concentration on price-
incentives of some proposed strategies for African
agricultural development, although not, as yet, the
EEC's. Better incentives (if we can define them, which
may need much better production data) can't be bad;
African farmers are just as responsive to price stimuli
as other farmers.'3 However, major diversion of scarce
strategy-building energies into efforts to improve price
policy, especially if they can be portrayed or
caricatured as foreign interference, is probably seldom
the best use of those energies in African agriculture,
for three reasons.
First, the response of total farm output to price-
incentives, while positive, is far smaller than for any
particular crop, because land or labour input must be
increased and not merely switched between uses.
Second, with technology so undeveloped, even
substantial price-responsiveness, raising some farmers'
outputs by 20 or 30 per cent, would add little to
production: 20 per cent of very little is very little.
Third, while price-incentives to increase output are
sensible for each country taken separately, they could
disastrously glut markets of some (mainly export)
crops for all African countries taken together.
Generally more important than price policies are
measures to make readily available timely inputs
(seed, fertiliser), good administrative and technical
personnel, and, increasingly, appropriate capital such
as small-scale irrigation or drainage. Even where
amply staffed, African ministries of agriculture are
frequently over-centralised, and hampered by lack of
vehicles, petrol, and appropriate incentives to officials
from reaching the field. A few unsuccessful, well-
publicised, large-scale and administratively complex
2 ratio of non-farm to farm output (and income) per person in
early modern development in nine now-developed countries was
around I '/2-2'/2: 1. In the 1960s, in Asia and Latin America it was
3-3'/:l - butin Africa, typically, it is at least 5:1 [Lipton 1977:
435-7].
was already clear from Dean [1966], esp. ch. 4.
t
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Traditional irrigation in Niger: animal-powered lfl irrigation, very common in Asia, is rare (and often in dire need of technical
improvements in sub-Saharan Africa.
gravity flow systems have unduly turned opinion
against irrigation, even including small lift systems.
However, the most important component of any food
strategy, in almost all African countries, will be the
development and delivery of technically valid,
economically field-tested recommendations and/or
new inputs - applied research and its extension. A
few outstanding research stations (mostly inter-
national) and a few thousand 'modern' farmers
(mostly profitable only because of successful angling
for highly selective subsidy amid a generally mulcted
agriculture) have concealed from many observers the
appalling void that fills the huge African spaces where
applicable knowledge and scientific smallholding
should be. Major crops such as maize, millet and
sorghum are broadcast randomly, seldom weeded,
denied water management, and hardly ever manured
on African smallholdings; as a result they commonly
yield at below half the levels prevailing in similar
circumstances in Asia.'4 Neither African farmers nor
the much-maligned extension workers are to blame.
4That is, with similar (and similarly risky) environments, and
roughly similar relative prices of inputs and outputs.
Little that is useful comes out of the extension
pipeline, but this is largely the result of the
technocratic nature of most research. Thus, farmers
are regularly advised to change planting dates or to
apply large amounts of, often remote, kraal manure.
To follow such advice has, at best, been proved
technically successful at the research station; seldom is
it profitable; and hardly ever has it been tested, for
profitability and reliability, under smallholders' actual
field conditions. Often in disillusionment and doubt,
extension workers pass on such advice; farmers
accept, or more often reject, it at their peril. The fault
lies with frequently irrelevant, sometimes self-serving
research.
Fortunately the major advances of smallholder-
responsive techno-economic research in Asia and
Latin America have provided a large backlog of ideas
for food crops: high-yielding varieties, timings,
spacings, crop-mixes, planting and soil-enriching
methods, water uses, and much more. These ideas are
waiting to be tested and adapted to various local
conditions in Africa. The long lags associated with the
initial application of basic research need not prevail in
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Rows of trees provide wind-breaks against erosion in Niger: but is erosion increased by traditional hoeing on hard soils and
unmixed cropping?
Africa. What is needed are career structures and 'tied'
funds to help African governments ensure that
farming research is rewarded if, and only if, it benefits
farmers, especially poor food-cultivators and herders.
If this is done, a research-based, EEC-backed 'food
strategy' could do what a hectoring 'policy dialogue'
cannot: persuade and help recipients to 'get the prices
right', and to increase resource allocations to
agriculture, by leading into a virtuous circle. If yields
are only 5 0-200 kg per acre, as is now typically the case
in much of Africa, the cost to government of
discouraging farm output by food price policies or
public resource allocations that appease urban
interests, seems relatively small. But if, for example,
the grain yields, foregone through inadequate
incentives or fertiliser delivery systems, have been
raised by researçh to 2-3 tons per acre, attainable
profitably by smallholders at acceptably low risk, the
costs of neglect are clear to government. Without a
research push - and a smallholder, food-linked, field-
test-oriented research strategy - good intentions with
regard to prices and allocations for African
agriculture are likely to be frustrated.
26
Similar principles, of centring easily rural development
around technologies that make sense for poor people
who own little but their labour-power, apply to the
artisan 'surround' of agriculture. Economists who get
to know African villages after experience in Asia or
Latin America are astounded by the apparent relative
absence of sophisticated but labour-intensive techno-
logy - not only in agriculture (row planting, water-
wheels, rotary weeding) but also in artisanship. The
two absences, indeed, are linked. Without a plane, a
vice, a saw, a workbench, and a few taught principles,
a carpenter can scarcely produce a seed-drill, an
appropriate plough, a water-wheel. A blacksmith
without a bellows is analogously handicapped,
whatever his skill in adapting parts from abandoned
cars. Moreover, an unproductive rural 'surround'
cannot afford to demand much food from local
farmers, just as it cannot supply them with much of the
wherewithal to grow or process it.
Labour or Capital
To base a food strategy on rapid adaptive research
into such 'poor people's technology' is, in a sense, to
9
'
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Mini-thresher, Niger.' will this raise output or just displace workers?
learn from Asia. However, it might be objected that in
Asia even such innovations as high-yielding cereals
have probably benefited the rural rich more than the
rural poor, even though they supply cheap calories,
are labour-intensive, and tend to reduce risk.'5 By
most Asian standards, however, Africa's greater rural-
urban inequality and intra-rural equality increase
both the urgency of the proposed research strategy
and its prospects of an equitable outcome.
A deeper objection is that most of Africa, unlike most
of South and East Asia, appears to have no land
shortage. Hence labour-intensive strategies of small-
farm crop production are not so obviously indicated.
Why not a strategy of big farms, capital-intensity in
crop production, and extensive animal grazing?
Merely to intone 'small is beautiful', or to treat
employment (i.e. drudgery) as an end in itself, is not to
dispose of this alternative strategy, which has lasting
'The poor have not lost absolutely; would have bren far worse off
without the extra food grown due to H YVs; and must have gained
from the technology's impact in raising labour/land ratlos and in
providing 'inferior goods'. But the rich gained proportionately
more [Lipton 1979a, 1978].
appeal for many African politicians and bureaucr
Big farms seem 'modern' and scientific; small far
seem random and messy.
However, the appearance is illusory since it is crea
by subsidies (on credit, fuels, etc) enjoyed only by
farms, and by ignorance of the complex economic
small farms. Population pressure is rendering Afric
agricultures every day more like Asia's. Land is gett
scarcer and dearer; techniques from stall-feed
through row-planting to composting are becom
increasingly attractive with the growing pressure
workers on scarce land and capital. All this
rendering small farmers, who choose higher ratio
workers to land and to capital, relatively m
efficient and big ones less so. Moreover, even wh
good land is genuinely plentiful, it may be costly
bring into cultivation or, once cleared, restricted
cultivation at existing yields by available labo
Suppose that a tractor could, in principle, ena
families to farm more land; could yields per acre
existing levels of water and manure use and of s
varieties, pay for the tractor's costs? Again, is
intensive, rather than extensive, farming indicated
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the apparently irreplaceable need for bird-scaring
labour at so-and-so-many hours daily per acre in
many of Africa's quelea-bird-infested lands?
But it is above all rising man/land ratios, together with
the sluggishness (and capital-intensity) of urban
industrialisation, that drives African food strategies
towards 'Asian', labour-intensive, and therefore
small-scale technologies and research guidelines, in
farming and rural artisanship alike [Lipton 1979].
Accustomed to centuries of labour shortage and of
plentiful arable land, and to decades of propaganda
for the big and shiny and pseudo-modern, African
rural people are trapped between equally inappropriate
traditions of labour-saving: the old (slash-and-burn)
and the new (tractors). They cannot be expected to be
suddenly enthusiastic for unknown labour-intensive
strategies, row-planting or water-wheels or whatever.
Such strategies must first be proved profitable and
safe. This will require their combination with scientific
inputs through adaptive research to select locally
suitable water techniques, soil-enriching additives and
methods, and high-yielding varieties of cereals and
root crops.
A Role for the EEC
What is the EEC's role in helping African
governments to develop such research-orientated
strategies for high-income, low-risk, labour-intensive
small farming? Three aspects of the EEC's approach
to the relationship with Africa will need fairly drastic
attention if such strategies are, in fact, to emerge from
Commissioner Pisani's initiative. They are the
management of the project cycle, the overview of
country programming, and the impact of EEC's own
trade policies.
The project cycle comprises five stages: identification,
design and appraisal, approval, implementation, and
monitoring and evaluation. It would, I suppose, be
fairly widely agreed in the 'aid business', as well as in
the relevant academic disciplines, that there are fairly
deep problems about the European Development
Fund's (EDF) project cycle, for aid to Lomé
Convention states. The long delays in disbursing
agreed funds, especially for the 'new' (1975!)
Associates, are the most obvious but not the most
alarming sign of this. Others are the frequency of
EDF-linked impediments in co-financed projects,
even if the EDF finances only a small part of them; the
fact that, much more than with other aid agencies, the
rise in the rural proportion of aid - the 'shitt towards
rural development' - in the data often turns out, on
the ground, to correspond to buildings, roads, or other
hardware with little benefit to rural people, especially
the poor; and the very large ratio of 'technical
assistance' (costing about $120,000 per professional-
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year) to project outlays, combined with a level of
project performance felt by most outside observers,
and by the EEC's own Court of Auditors, to be well
below par. When in 1979 the Swazi Minister of
Finance remarked that EEC aid, while very generous
in its terms, was so fraught with problems that he
wondered if it was worth his country's while to accept
it, he merely expressed in extreme form a common
sentiment. What is going wrong?
As regards project identification, EEC's possession of
a 'delegate [in each ACP country] who deals
exclusively with aid' should place EDF in a specially
advantaged group of aid funds.'6 In practice, however,
the delegate's capacity in project administration is
severely constrained.
As regards appraisal, recipient countries do not seem
to feel that they know enough to decide whether a
particular project is likely to be appraised favourably.
'In the negotiations for Lomé II, [AC P] suggested that
a checklist of criteria used in appraisal should be
communicated' [White 1981:55], i.e. not even a
checklist was available during the first four EDFs, and
even now no formal appraisal rules (i.e. weights to
indicate the relative importance of checklist items)
appear to be available to ACP national authorities.
This is bound to be especially troublesome for
agricultural, and even more for wider rural-
development, projects, because their justification is
especially likely to depend on the relative weights
attached to different types of expected returns:
financial, economic (i.e. allowing for price 'distortions'
and for costs and benefits outside the project's
immediate range of application), and social (i.e.
allowing, in a stated way, for the distribution of gains
and losses from the project).
As regards approval, the EDF gains because it has
simple procedures for small and emergency projects,
and separate funds to pay for them. But it loses, at
least in theory, because the techno-economic
judgements of the aid agency (effectively DG 8) are
not the last word in approving or rejecting a project.
Projects also have to be referred to an international
committee, the 'EDF Committee', on which all 10
EEC members are represented. The precise distri-
bution of responsibility between DG 8 and the EDF
committee is a shadowy area, and DG 8 is jealous of its
formal power. Nevertheless, the need to get the
approval of 10 nationalistic, heterogeneous donors
must cast a long shadow. It must, that is, constrain the
design of projects that EDF delegates can recommend
ACP governments to identify, or can themselves
appraise favourably. The rising share of rural
development projects in EDF4 and EDF5 plainly
16 Only France and the USA appear to have similar non-embassy,
field missions for aid in most recipient ldcs [White 1981].
owes something to EEC enlargement in 1973, by two
countries relatively heavily committed to such
projects, Denmark (via DANIDA) and the UK (since
the 1975 White Paper, Changing emphasis in British aid
policies: more aid for the poorest).
As the tide of support for poverty-orientation gives
way to the new wave of mean monetarism, associated
with the promotion of inefficient exports through aid,
the Commission and EDF may find donor readiness
to approve rural development projects eroded. DG 8
itself is fighting such trends, as M. Pisani's
memorandum indicates, but its unenthusiastic re-
ception by donor politicians suggests that pro-
tectionism, Samuel Smilesery and slump in developed
countries will continue to imperil approvals for
socially-effective uses of aid. If so, the multilateral
politicisation of EEC approval procedures will not
help.
After approval comes implementation. Tied procure-
ment, being 'spread' across competing suppliers
throughout the EEC, ought to create far fewer
problems than when goods and services can be bought
only in one, sometimes small and uncompetitive,
donor country. Moreover, local costs form a relatively
large part of rural development project aid. Hence
EEC aid to rural development projects should be less
vulnerable to procurement delays than tied bilateral
and/or non-rural aid.
Finally come monitoring and evaluation. Much
attention is drawn, from time to time, to public and
detailed blasts at completed (or stymied) rural and
other projects from the EEC's Court of Auditors. The
impression is given by these reports that EEC aid is
managed openly, self-critically and responsively. The
independent, unbureaucratic and frank approach of
the Auditors is indeed praiseworthy; many bilateral
donors, notably the UK, would also benefit if
evaluation were handled independently of the aid
agency. Unfortunately, while the Auditors' legal and
accounting expertise is useful in detecting graft or
incompetence, it is of little value in establishing the
vital facts sought by project evaluation: the economic
(not financial) rate of return on project outlays, and
the distribution of costs and benefits between rich and
poor, urban and rural, men and women, old and
young. Moreover, brief visits to a problem project,
however sensational their outcomes, cannot replace
socio-economic evaluation, in operation as well as
immediately after completion, of at least a substantial
random sample of projects. Only the World Bank and
USAID, so far as I know, do this systematically. Lack
of evaluation - let alone of a 'lesson-learning'
mechanism, an institutional memory for moving from
past evaluations to new designs - is especially
damaging in rural development, with its relatively
great need for cross-ministry integration, its recent
expansion, and its high proportion of costs devoted to
non-standardised, often local, software.
EEC aid suffers from being neither bilateral nor
multilateral, neither centralised nor decentralised. At
each stage of the cycle, projects appear therefore to go
through three sets of hoops, in turn supplied by
delegates, local Commission institutions, and national
donor politics. Rural projects, which are less
responsive to (and less dependent on) standardised
hardware and which have recently expanded their
share in the EDF portfolio, are especially vulnerable
to the resulting problems, encompassing not only
project aid but also food aid.
The facts remain that Africa's increasing net food
imports are its central development constraint; that
growing hunger is its central poverty problem; and
that EEC is well placed to help, and in the medium
term to gain by so doing. However, the project cycle,
and the underlying problem of country programming,
will need attention, if this potential is to be realised.
If the EEC is to use its relationship with ACP to help
individual African countries to implement their food
strategies, then the EDF's project cycle will need to be
coordinated, at a level permitting unified support of a
recipient nation's food strategy, with EEC's own food
aid, and possibly (though this presents a major
problem) with bilateral aid from major EEC donors.
Finally, EEC's aid policies need to be made more
consistent with its trade policies, as these affect
developing nations' capacity to provide adequate
calories for all their people, and to avoid unsustainable
levels of food imports. The reorganisation of DG 8 in
September 1982 is designed to facilitate such
coordination and is therefore to be welcomed.
Performance under the new system should be
monitored closely to see whether further changes will
be necessary.
M. Pisani clearly envisages that food aid, not just the
EDF, should support national food strategies [COM
(82) 640:final, para 2.2]. Yet food aid today, both in
the political reality and in the formal structure of the
Commission, is more an upshot of the CAP's
surpluses than a part of EEC development policy. In
the latter, its main role is to restore regional balance;
and the real conflict between this goal, and the
coordination of EDF and food aid to support national
food strategies, has to be tackled.
EDF's extreme African emphasis owes more to
nineteenth-century colonial history, 1957 negotiating
practice, and the wishes of a few French firms, than to
EEC interests or the requirements of development and
poverty-alleviation. In 1960 or even 1970, the
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incidence of poverty was much more severe in South
Asia. If Africa has now overtaken South Asia in the
grisly race for the title of hungriest region, it has been
the result largely of extreme neglect of agriculture and
of poor policy response to the oil crises. Africa has
fallen back despite aid-per-person over double South
Asian levels since 1960. Prima facie, it looks as if it is
techno-economic rural research and nationwide skill
development that constrain most African nations'
performance in growing, feeding their people, and
reducing poverty. It is certainly true that technical
assistance is relevant to the alleviation of such
constraints, but it is the Asian nations, aid-starved
anyway, that really suffer from conventional capital
constraints. Normally Africa is the locus of talk about
'shortage of good projects', lack of absorptive
capacity, etc. Indeed in the l960s aid-per-person made
a major difference to the growth-rate comparisons in
Asia - but not in Africa [Papanek 1972, 1973]. Yet
the regional aid disparity is likely to worsen in the
1980s: US aid is becoming more 'strategic' in
orientation, i.e. probably less South Asian; the World
Bank proposes to double concessional flows to sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1980s, leaving little or nothing
for expanded flows to South Asia)7
The small, if growing, non-associates' aid budget, of
which India is a major beneficiary. has brought a
limited but welcome reduction in the EEC's
contribution to the anti-Asian bias in world aid flows,
EEC food aid has led to far larger reductions in that
contribution, since it frees resources for development
investment by allowing recipients to cut commercial
food imports. Should EEC (even in the interests of
food strategies) divert that gain towards Africa, most
of which, though absolutely poor and under-aided, is
over-aided relatively to the desperate poverty of, say,
Bangladesh, Bihar or Java?
Perhaps one remedy is to nominate, fairly soon, one or
two interested Asian 'non-associates' who wish to
design a food strategy, for which their food aid and
(enhanced?) parts of the non-associates' aid pro-
gramme could be supportively used. Meanwhile, a
substantial minority even of EEC food aid goes to
Africa. Its planning and concentration, in ways that
support states seeking to develop food strategies
(instead of undermining those who seek such
strategies, by depressing domestic food prices or by
seeming to remove the urgency of investment in food
production) is clearly sensible. But it raises problems
inside the Commission, both of the rights and powers
of different Directorates, and of the realpolitik of
European agriculture; for example, the issue of 'grain
versus grazing' as encouraged by the balance of EEC
farm subsidies cannot be immune, if DG 8 is allowed
'7Given a) the difficulties of IDA replenishment; b) new claims for
China.
30
to influence surplus disposal (and ultimately surplus
build-up) by adducing issues such as food strategy for
ACP nations.
M. Pisani has sometimes suggested that he hopes to
coordinate in support of ACP national food strategies,
not just EEC project and food aid, but also EEC
members' bilateral programmes [Stevens 1983, ch.
13]. However, the EDF now absorbs only 10 per cent
of EEC members' capital aid. Even that 10 per cent is
unpopular with several powerful member states. The
reasons are partly that bilateral aid is better than
multilateral aid for promoting sales of overpriced
donor exports, and for beating the nationalist drum;
but there are better reasons, too. EEC aid is seen as
having high administrative costs, little parliamentary
control, and severe management problems. Both M.
Cheysson and M. Pisani have tried to tackle these
issues; but major successes are probably required
before there can be much chance of harnessing
bilateral programmes to Brussels-designed support
from EEC for national food strategies. A useful start
could be made by improving the links between
explicitly food-orientated components of bilateral and
EEC aid programmes.
A final question concerns the linkage of EEC trade
and production policies to its support of African food
strategies. Even more than food aid, such policies are
at present firmly outside DG 8's sphere of influence.
Yet in at least two areas, sugar and vegetable oils, the
side-effects of the CAP damage the incomes of poor
farmers in developing countries and therefore their
capacity to buy food (or to pay for investments in its
production). African and other Associates do not
escape the impact (over a third of Associates' sugar
exports are currently sold at world prices, depressed
by the EEC's de facto dumping). Special arrangements
for African beef exports, while generous and welcome
in isolation, can shift farm resources away from small
farmers growing cheap (i.e. usually cereal or root)
calories for local consumption. On the borderline
between aid and trade is Stabex; the significance of its
benefits has been questioned in an excellent recent
analysis [Hewitt 1983], but its net effect has to be to
shift ACP governments, and indirectly farmers, away
from food production for home use, and towards
commodities sold to EEC with some degree of
apparent stability of earnings.
The EEC's food strategy, especially in combination
with parallel approaches in other aid agencies (such as
Sweden's, and IFAD), could be a major advance in
developing a coherent, locally-specific set of strategies
to tackle the central problem of poverty in Africa. This
article has argued that, to succeed, such an approach
will require a) concentration upon groups at major
nutritional risk - groups that are smaller but also
rather harder to reach than is usually claimed; b) a
systematic prior effort to generate regular national
procedures to gather reliable farm output, and to some
extent input, data; c) an approach to developing
agriculture and the rural surround that is based on
techno-economic research and its delivery embodied
in field-tested, attractive inputs - not on 'pushing a
piece of string' by seeking to develop agriculture via
incentives or institutions based on the present techno-
economic darkness; d) some 'learning from Asia' in
respect of technology and farm-size policies; and e) the
resolution of critical questions about the procedures
and powers of EEC itself, in respect both of the project
cycle and of the political context of Third World
policies These problems are raised in this article, not
to denigrate the 'food strategy' approach, but - by
outlining some major problems in making it into a
reality - to improve, however slightly, its chances of
success.
A version of this article is being simultaneously
published in the ODI Development Policy Review.
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